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The Public Service Loan Forgiveness
Program: The Need for Better Employment
Eligibility Regulations
GREGORY CRESPI†
ABSTRACT
A few people have now applied for and obtained tax-exempt debt
forgiveness of their federal student Direct Loans under the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program after satisfying the
requirements of 10 years of post-October 1, 2007 employment in a
“public service job.” While only a relatively small number of people
have received debt forgiveness to date, I estimate that as the
number of persons eligible ramps up sharply in 2018 and thereafter
eventually 200,000 people a year or more will obtain debt
forgiveness under the PSLF program, at a total cost to the Treasury
of $12 billion per year or more. Estimates are that up to one-quarter
of all employment qualifies as a public service job that will allow the
employee to obtain debt forgiveness for these loans.
For such a large and costly program, the precise eligibility criteria
are crucial. The statutory definition of a “public service job” is very
broad and specifically lists numerous categories of public service,
and is in some ways ambiguous. The Department of Education
(DOE) in 2008 issued regulations regarding PSLF program
employment eligibility, but those regulations have serious
deficiencies. First, the regulations improperly define a public
service job in a manner that is inconsistent with the statute by
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imposing a “public service organization” employer requirement that
is not in the statute. This requirement works to disqualify some
statutorily-listed forms of public service employment from debt
forgiveness eligibility, in particular public services employment
provided on behalf of for-profit businesses or certain non-profit
employers, and also improperly allows eligibility for debt
forgiveness for some employees of private non-profit employers who
are not employed to provide a qualifying public service. Second, the
regulations fail to clarify vague statutory language regarding what
constitutes “public” service, most importantly regarding the scope
of “public interest law services.”
The DOE has also recently rescinded several previously granted
certifications of employment as qualifying on the basis of a newly
imposed restrictive “primary purpose of the employer” requirement
that is not in the governing statute nor in the DOE regulations,
actions that have been challenged in court by the American Bar
Association. Even if this restriction is upheld, which appears
unlikely, there is a strong argument that the DOE should be
estopped from rescinding prior certifications.
In order to avoid unnecessary litigation once the expected large
number of applications for debt forgiveness begin to be filed in 2018
and afterwards, I recommend that the DOE first seek Congressional
action to clarify the contours of the PSLF program’s employment
eligibility statute. Further, while awaiting such action, the DOE
should rescind its public service organization eligibility
requirement which is inconsistent with the statute, clarify that
there is no primary purpose of the employer requirement, and
provide much more detailed guidance regarding the contours of the
various statutorily-specified forms of qualifying public service,
especially public interest law service. If PSLF program employment
eligibility is to be either narrowed or expanded, this should be done
through appropriate legislation, and not through unauthorized and
covert DOE actions.

INTRODUCTION
Under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program
(PSLF program) a person who has taken out Federal Direct
Loans to finance their higher education, and thereafter
enrolls in a qualifying debt repayment plan, works for ten
years in a “public service job” after October 1, 2007, and also
makes all of the required payments on this debt over that
time period, will then be entitled to have the remaining
principal and interest due on his debt forgiven. 1 In addition,
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2012). Throughout this Article I will refer to the
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that forgiven debt is excluded from gross income for income
tax purposes, unlike debts forgiven under the other federal
income-based repayment plans which are regarded as
taxable cancellation of indebtedness income.2
The phrase “public service job” is defined very broadly by
the statute establishing the PSLF program as including any
“full-time” employment by certain employers, as well as
including employment providing any of a number of
specifically-listed public services on behalf of other
employers.3 It has been estimated that approximately onequarter of all jobs in the economy qualify as “public service
jobs” under this broad definition.4 People first started
meeting the ten years of post-October 1, 2007 public service
requirement for obtaining debt forgiveness under the PSLF
program in October of 2017. While relatively few people have
so far qualified, I have estimated in another article that once
the program ramps up to a steady-state number of persons
regularly becoming eligible for debt forgiveness, as many as
200,000 or more people each year will seek forgiveness.
Those persons are predicted to have an average amount of
remaining student loan debt of about $60,000, which could

statutory Public Service Loan Forgiveness provisions as a “program” in
accordance with commonly accepted parlance. In actuality, those provisions do
not really establish a separate loan repayment “program,” but only create a
special accelerated debt forgiveness mechanism with particular eligibility
requirements that complements the various federal student loan repayment
plans.
2. I.R.C. § 108(f)(1) (2012). This exclusion from gross income does not apply
for debts forgiven under other federal income-based student loan debt repayment
plans.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B).
4. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15–663, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS:
EDUCATION COULD DO MORE TO HELP ENSURE BORROWERS ARE AWARE OF
REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS OPTIONS 27 (2015) (citing Bureau of Labor
Statistics figures that 24.7% of US workers—32.5 million out of a total of 131.7
million US workers nationwide—were employed in PSLF-qualifying public
service jobs); JASON DELISLE, BROOKINGS INST., THE COMING PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN
FORGIVENESS BONANZA 3 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-comingpublic-service-loan-forgiveness-bonanza/.
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cost the Treasury at least $12 billion per year.5
Given how large and costly this program will become
over the next few years, it is crucial that the eligibility
criteria are made clear. I set forth below in its entirely the
statutory definition of a qualifying “public service job”:
(B) Public service job The term “public service job” means—
(i) a full-time job in emergency management, government
(excluding time served as a member of Congress), military service,
public safety, law enforcement, public health (including nurses,
nurse practitioners, nurses in a clinical setting, and full-time
professionals engaged in health care practitioner occupations and
health support occupations, as such terms are defined by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics), public education, social work in a public
child or family service agency, public interest law services
(including prosecution or public defense or legal advocacy on behalf
of low-income communities at a nonprofit organization), early
childhood education (including licensed or regulated childcare,
Head Start, and State funded prekindergarten), public service for
individuals with disabilities, public service for the elderly, public
library sciences, school-based library sciences and other schoolbased services, or at an organization that is described in section
501(c)(3) of title 26 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a)
of such title; or
(ii) teaching as a full-time faculty member at a Tribal College or
University as defined in section 1059c(b) of this title [20] and other
faculty teaching in high-needs subject areas or areas of shortage
(including nurse faculty, foreign language faculty, and part-time
faculty at community colleges), as determined by the Secretary.6

This definition is linguistically awkward in that it
juxtaposes two very different bases under which employment
will qualify as a “public service job.” First, it includes
employment by certain employers whose full-time employees
will qualify for the PSLF program regardless of their job
duties, specifically governments and Internal Revenue Code

5. Gregory Crespi, Will the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program Ever
Forgive Any Loans?, 51 Conn. L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 2019) (manuscript at 38–
39), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978111. To keep this sum of money in proper
perspective, it is less than one-half of the annual Pell Grant expenditures. U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM 2016–2017 END OF YEAR REPORT
tbl.1 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-data.html.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B).
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(Code) section 501(c)(3) organizations that are also taxexempt under Code section 501(a). Second, it lists several
types of public service employment that will qualify if that
employment is done on a full-time basis, regardless of who
the employer is and regardless of what other activities the
employer may engage in. These listed public services
importantly include military service, law enforcement,
public health, public interest law services, public education,
and teaching in high-needs subject areas as determined by
the Department of Education (DOE) Secretary, among other
several other forms of public service.
This cumbersome definition also suffers from both
vagueness and ambiguity problems that call for clarification
by the DOE, the agency charged with administering the
PSLF program. The available legislative history of this
definition is quite sparse and does not provide much useful
guidance.7 In 2008, the DOE issued regulations
implementing the program; 8 but as I will later discuss, their
regulations as to what employment will qualify as a “public

7. In the House of Representatives version of the College Cost Reduction Act
of 2007, which contained the original version of the PSLF program eligibility
requirements, the requisite employment was defined in Section 132 as a “public
sector job,” and included most of the employment categories later adopted into
law. H.R. REP. NO. 110–210, at 14 (2007) [hereinafter COLLEGE COST REDUCTION
ACT OF 2007]. That language was intended to provide loan forgiveness to “public
sector employees,” id. at 39, 71–72, but the Report did not define what was meant
by the “public sector” phrase, in particular whether it extended beyond
government employees. In the later Conference Report the Senate amendment
containing the current “public service job” definition was substituted for the
earlier House “public sector job” definition. H.R. REP. NO. 110-310, at 18, 47–48
(2007) (Conf. Rep.). That amendment was explained as creating a loan
forgiveness plan for “public service employees” rather than for “public sector
employees” as under the House version, id. at 47–48, but the Conference Report
did not explain whether this change in phrasing was intended as an expansion of
eligibility, and if so what was the rationale for this expansion of eligibility, or
what were the precise contours of eligibility outside of public sector or Code
section 501(c)(3) organization employment.
8. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2017). These regulations were issued by the DOE on
October 23, 2008. See generally 73 Fed. Reg. 63,232–63,259 (Oct. 23, 2008) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. 674, 682, and 685).
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service job”9 need much more detailed elaboration as to the
contours of several types of qualifying public service
employment; they are also inconsistent with the governing
statute in some important regards. Let me set out below
some of the many issues that the PSLF program eligibility
statute raises that require regulatory clarification:
1) What are the requirements for a job to be “full-time?”;
2) How broadly is “government” to be defined? For
example, does “government” include not only federal, state,
and local governments but also domestic intergovernmental
or public regional agencies, and/or quasi-public local
organizations supported in part by public funding, or only
direct government employees? Does “government” also
include
foreign
governments
and/or
international
intergovernmental organizations?;
3) Given that all full-time employment by government is
denoted by the statute as a qualifying public service job,
what sorts of non-governmental employment was intended
to be encompassed by the phrases “emergency management,”
“military service,” “law enforcement,” and “public safety”
given that these kinds of activities are overwhelmingly
carried out by employees of governmental bodies that are, for
that reason alone, necessarily doing public service jobs? Are
these phrases intended to cover employment by private
contractors that are not part of government, but whose
activities are closely integrated with those of a governmental
body providing one or more of these public services? Or
should those phrases be interpreted as redundant, as mere
surplusage whose content is already necessarily included
within “government” employment?;
4) With regard to employers that are neither
governments nor Code 501(c)(3) organizations, but provide
one or more of the statutorily-listed public services, must an
employee work full-time in the provision of one or more of

9. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b).
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those public services to qualify as having a public service job,
or will any full-time employment for that employer qualify?
Does full-time public service employment for such an
employer qualify as a public service job when the employee
provides those services outside of the United States? Does it
matter for this question if the employer does not operate in
the United States at all?;
5) Not all of the forms of qualifying service specified in
the statutory public service job definition are prefaced by the
term “public,” but many of them are, specifically public
safety, public health, public education, public interest law
services, public service for individuals with disabilities,
public service for the elderly, and public library services. All
of these services are necessarily provided to members of the
public, regardless of who provides the services. Given this
fact, under what circumstances, if any, would any of these
services not be regarded as “public” services? This
determination would be important for services provided by a
person who is not an employee of either a governmental body
or a Code 503(c)(3) organization whose full-time work would
automatically qualify as a public service job;
6) There are many questions raised by the statute
specifically with regard to “public interest law services.”
First, is the (“including…”) explanatory parenthetical that
lists several forms of public interest law service intended to
be exclusive, or merely illustrative? If it were intended to
only be illustrative of the nature of such services, which
appears more likely, what services will qualify as “law”
services beyond the obviously included services of a licensed
attorney providing legal advice or representation for clients?
Would, for example, paralegals working with attorneys to
provide such advice or representation, or employees of
business firms that are employed to provide document
storage and retrieval services or other support services for
lawyers and law firms, perhaps among numerous other nonlawyer clients, be providing qualifying “law” services? And
given that all legal services benefit some member(s) of the
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public, sometimes unfortunately at the expense of other
members of the public (consider an attorney representing a
tenant in an eviction proceeding, to the disadvantage of the
tenant’s landlord), what legal services will qualify as “public
interest” legal services? Is there a particular defined group
of people to whom providing legal assistance is to be regarded
as in the public interest? Does whether legal services are in
the “public interest” depend wholly or in part upon whether
the legal services are publicly or privately funded? What if
the legal services are partially or wholly funded by donations
rather than by the person benefitted by those legal services
or by public sources? Does that make them public interest
legal services?;
7) With regard to “public education,” does “education”
include only classroom instruction, or does it also include
other forms of outreach, online or in-person, intended to
provide people with information and education? And when is
education “public” as opposed to “private?” Does education
partly funded by donations and tuitions and partly funded
from public sources qualify as public education?
There are other questions that this terse and strikingly
broad statutory definition of a qualifying public service job
raises, but I think I have made my point. Congress has
passed an extremely broad and general framework for
defining public service jobs which could extend to cover tens
of millions of people. This general framework obviously
needs to be supplemented with detailed regulatory guidance
from the DOE for many of these categories, particularly with
regard to the contours of the various qualifying public service
employment categories when those services are performed by
persons who are neither government employees nor Code
section 501(c)(3) organization employees. But as I will
discuss below, the DOE’s 2008 regulations for the most part,
unfortunately, fail to provide this guidance. In addition, the
regulations are, in some important aspects, inconsistent with
the statute. They are sometimes too narrow in their
articulation of the employment eligibility criteria and, in
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other ways, too broad.
As people have now started qualifying for debt
forgiveness, and because the number of people seeking debt
forgiveness will probably quickly grow to a veritable flood of
200,000 or more persons per year, the need for more detailed
regulatory clarification from the DOE that is consistent with
the statutory mandate as to eligibility is becoming rather
urgent. If the DOE does not issue such new regulations in a
timely manner, then there is likely to arise class action
litigation initiated by disappointed applicants or other
persons regarding various employment eligibility issues that
will force the DOE to do this anyway, so it is better done
sooner rather than later.
In Part I of this Article, I will provide more background
information about the PSLF program and about the large
scale on which debt forgiveness will likely be sought under
this program, and about some of the policy issues this will
raise. In Part II of this Article, I will set forth and critique
the DOE’s existing regulations that relate to employment
eligibility for debt forgiveness. In Part III, I will discuss
ongoing litigation between the DOE and the American Bar
Association (ABA) regarding a recent attempt by the DOE to
narrow the program’s employment eligibility criteria,
without either seeking statutory amendment or formally
promulgating new regulations, by rescinding prior
assurances given individuals that their employment would
qualify for debt forgiveness under the program. In Part IV, I
will recommend some regulations that the DOE might
consider adopting in order to clarify what would constitute a
qualifying “public service job,” and that a particular existing
regulation be rescinded. Part V will present a brief
conclusion.
Finally, as has been anecdotally recognized for some
time and now is well documented in a recent Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau report, even before borrowers
have qualified for and start filing applications for debt
forgiveness under the PSLF program, they have encountered
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a number of significant problems in their relationships with
their loan servicers that have been designated to manage
their loans by the DOE.10 This short Article will only focus
upon the program’s employment eligibility criteria and will
not address these other concerns; however, the DOE should
also attempt to address these loan servicer relationship
difficulties in a timely and effective manner.
I. THE PSLF PROGRAM
Under the PSLF program, people will be eligible to
obtain forgiveness of their remaining Direct Loan debts after
completing 10 years of post-October 1, 2007 qualifying public
service employment and debt repayments. The first few
persons to qualify for debt forgiveness did so in October of
2017. Beginning in 2012, the DOE has provided an annual
Employment Certification Form,11 and recommends that
persons who may later wish to avail themselves of the PSLF
program’s debt forgiveness, once they become eligible, file
that application form annually, on a voluntary basis, in order
to have their prior year’s employment certified in advance as
qualifying as a “public service job” so that when they later
apply for debt forgiveness they need not have any lingering
concerns as to their eligibility. The DOE has designated
FedLoan Servicing as its contractor to review such
applications and grant or deny such certifications, and then
to take over servicing of the loans of those persons whose

10. See generally CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, STAYING ON
TRACK WHILE GIVING BACK (2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
201706_cfpb_PSLF-midyear-report.pdf. The problems with loan servicers
encountered by borrowers include: problems enrolling in and recertifying income
under their repayment plans, problems relating to payment processing and
allocation for borrowers with multiple loans, problems obtaining the information
needed to avoid defaults, id. at 18, and a broad range of problems relating
specifically to the PSLF program. Id. at 27–43.
11. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS: EMPLOYMENT
CERTIFICATION FORM, OMB NO. 1845-0110 (2012), http://studentaid.ed.gov/
sa/sites/default/files/public-service-employment-certification-form.pdf.
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application for certification has been approved.12 Over half a
million people have had one or more periods of employment
certified as qualifying through this procedure,13 with over
200,000 people first obtaining certification in 2016 alone. 14
I have estimated that a very large number of people will
eventually seek debt forgiveness after ten years of public
service employment,15 many more than were originally
expected to utilize this program when it was first enacted, 16
with the annual number of applications for debt forgiveness
likely growing very rapidly in 2018 and thereafter to as many
as 200,000 or more.17 Moreover, while those persons who
have taken out only undergraduate student loans will, in
most cases, have relatively modest amounts of remaining
debt to forgive after ten years of making repayments
(generally no more than approximately $25,000) 18 many

12. Id.
13. FEDERAL STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN
FORGIVENESS
EMPLOYMENT
CERTIFICATION
FORMS
(2016),
http://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio. As of the fourth
quarter of 2016 a total of 552,931 borrowers have had at least one employment
certification application approved. Id.
14. Id.
15. I have estimated that eventually approximately 200,000 or more people
each year will file for debt forgiveness under the PSLF program. Crespi, supra
note 5, at 38–39.
16. At the time of enactment of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program,
the Congressional Budget Office estimated that eventually 50,000 people each
year would seek debt forgiveness under the program. H.R. REP. NO. 110-210 at
72.
17. Crespi, supra note 5, at 37–39.
18. The federal government limits Direct Loan eligibility to $31,000 for
undergraduate education, although it has increased that limit to $57,500 for
those undergraduates who qualify as independent and not financially supported
by their parents. Id.
Consider an example I have presented in another article: Consider the
circumstances of a typical person who graduates from an undergraduate program
with the average amount of $30,000 of Direct Loan debt now owed by
undergraduate borrowers, at a typical 5% overall annual interest rate, and has a
spouse and child, and then takes a qualifying public service position with a
$45,000 starting salary, and then enrolls in the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) loan
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lawyers and doctors have taken on much larger, six-figure
loan debts to finance their undergraduate and graduate
education, and then will have earned relatively modest
salaries in the early years of their careers in public service
jobs, leading to minimal or often even negative amortization
of their loan debts during the qualifying ten-year period of
employment. Those persons consequently will have very
large amounts of debt forgiven, often more than $200,000. 19
repayment plan. Under that plan this person will be required to make annual
repayments of only 10% of the difference between their adjusted gross income
and 150% of the poverty level wage for a person with a family of that size. For
that person their annual payment obligation would be approximately ($45,000 $30,000) x 10% = $1,500 per year. This would be just enough to meet the annual
interest payments on their loan debt of $30,000 x 5% = $1,500. In succeeding
years, with modest annual raises and corresponding modest increases in their
annual payment obligations under the PAYE plan, that person would begin to
amortize their principal debt, but only by a few hundred dollars per year. After
ten years that person would still have on the order of $25,000 or so of debt to be
forgiven. Crespi, supra note 5, at 18 n.30. However, an independent
undergraduate borrower who may have borrowed as much as $57,500 in Direct
Loans, may well have as much as $50,000 or more of remaining debt at the time
of debt forgiveness.
19. Consider again an example I have presented in another article: “Consider
the circumstances of a typical person who graduates from law school with a
combined undergraduate and law school Direct Loan debt load of $150,000, at a
typical 6% overall annual interest rate that reflects the higher interest rate
charged graduate school borrowers compared to undergraduates. Assume again
that this person also has a spouse and child, and then takes a qualifying public
service position as an attorney with a $55,000 starting salary, and then enrolls
in the PAYE loan repayment plan. Under that plan this person will be required
to make annual repayments of only 10% of the difference between their adjusted
gross income and 150% of the poverty level wage for a person with a family of
that size. For that person their annual payment obligation would be
approximately ($55,000 -$30,000) x 10% = $2,500 per year. This would be far
short of the amount needed just enough to meet the annual interest payments on
their loan debt of $150,000 x 6% = $9,000. Their debt would therefore increase by
$9,000 - $2,500 = $6,500 that first year. In succeeding years, with modest annual
raises and corresponding modest increases in their annual payment obligations
under the PAYE plan, the amount of unpaid interest that would accrue would
gradually reduce, but the negative amortization would likely persist for the entire
ten-year period, leading to a total principal plus accrued interest debt of over
$200,000 at the time of debt forgiveness.” Crespi, supra note 5, at 18 n.33.
A medical school graduate with similar initial debt and family circumstances will
be in essentially the same position as the law school graduate discussed above,
except for the fact that they would be likely to receive a substantial salary
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All of this forgiven debt will cost the federal Treasury a very
substantial sum—perhaps as much as $12 billion per year or
more.20
The Obama Administration in its final year showed some
concern over the growing recognition that there would be a
very significant cost to the federal government from large
numbers of people having substantial debts forgiven under
the PSLF program, and that these benefits would be
regressive in incidence and skewed heavily towards midcareer lawyers and doctors. For these reasons, the
Administration included in their final budget proposal a
recommendation that the amount of future Direct Loan debt
that could be forgiven be prospectively limited to $57,500—
the amount of Direct Loan debt that could be incurred by an
independent undergraduate borrower.21 This limitation
would gradually reduce the costs of the program over time as
it phased in, and would immediately reduce the
attractiveness of the program for prospective lawyers,
doctors, and other persons considering expensive graduate
school programs without significant financial aid. This
proposal, however, was never enacted into law.
A second indication of budgetary concern was shown by
the Obama Administration in 2016 when the DOE
retroactively rescinded a number of employment
certifications that would have qualified people for the PSLF
program. The certifications were made by FedLoan
Servicing, a contractor retained by the DOE to evaluate
applications, service the loans of the persons certified, and
increase after completion of their internship for the last three years of their tenyear public service period, perhaps even enough to repay some of the accrued
interest from the seven years of pronounced negative amortization. Id. at 19 n.36.
20. I have estimated that the annual costs of debt forgiveness under the PSLF
program will eventually become as large as $12 billion per year, or even higher,
as 200,000 or more people each year seek forgiveness of an average amount of
debt of $60,000 apiece. Id. at 39–40.
21. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2016 EDUCATION BUDGET SUMMARY AND
BACKGROUND INFORMATION (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/
budget16/summary/16summary.pdf.
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state that a period of their employment qualified them for
the PSLF program. In 2016, however, the DOE determined
that several of these certifications made through FedLoan
Servicing had been certified in error and the employment did
not, in fact, qualify as a public service job; these rescission
notices eventually led to a lawsuit being filed against the
DOE by the ABA, which I will later discuss.22
The Trump Administration has shown similar concerns
regarding the large costs of the PSLF program by including
in their initial May 2017 budget proposal a recommendation
that the program be prospectively eliminated entirely for
most Direct Loans taken out after July 1, 2018. 23 This
proposal did not, however, more aggressively recommend
that the program be retroactively eliminated for existing
Direct Loan borrowers, nor that the current tax exemption
provided for debts that will be forgiven under the program be
eliminated.24 But given the estimated $12 billion per year or
more that the PSLF program will cost the Treasury,25 and
given the regressive distribution of the program’s benefits
being heavily skewed in favor of relatively affluent midcareer doctors and lawyers,26 whether or not the current
Trump Administration proposal for prospective repeal is ever
adopted once the PSLF program ramps up for existing Direct
22. See infra Part III.
23. The Trump Administration’s first proposed Department of Education
budget calls for ending the PSLF program as part of an overall attempt to reduce
the DOE’s budget by $9.2 billion, or 13.6% of the current approved level of
spending. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: A NEW
FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN GREATNESS, FISCAL YEAR 2018, 20, 33 (2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/budget.pdf
[hereinafter Trump Proposed Budget (2017)]; Emma Brown, et al, Trump’s first
full education budget: Deep cuts to public school programs in pursuit of school
choice,
WASH.
POST
(May
17,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trumps-first-full-educationbudget-deep-cuts-to-public-school-programs-in-pursuit-of-schoolchoice/2017/05/17/2a25a2cc-3a41-11e7-8854-21f359183e8c_story.html.
24. Trump Proposed Budget (2017), supra note 23.
25. Crespi, supra note 5, at 40.
26. Id. at 41.
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Loan borrowers and becomes more visible and politically
salient, new efforts may be made by the Trump
Administration (or a later Administration) or members of
Congress for a more aggressive retroactive curtailment or
termination of its debt forgiveness benefits or of the tax
exemption for those benefits. If so, the issue of retroactivity
will present a sharp tension between the expectations of
hundreds of thousands to millions of Direct Loan borrowers
regarding eventually having their remaining debts forgiven,
without tax consequences, and the legitimate public concerns
regarding the large cost and regressive incidence of the
benefits of the program. Whether an attempt to retroactively
terminate the PSLF program by statute or to retroactively
eliminate the tax exemption for forgiven debt could be
accomplished consistent with contract law principles and
Constitutional limitations is a close and difficult question,
one that I have addressed in some detail in a separate
article.27
But for now, while the current PSLF program is in force
and the crush of debt forgiveness applications is soon to
begin, it is incumbent upon the DOE to make as clear as
possible and in a manner consistent with the governing
statute what forms of employment will qualify as a public
service job that will eventually lead to debt forgiveness. Let
me turn now to the existing DOE program eligibility
regulations.
II. THE CURRENT DOE EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY
REGULATIONS
In October of 2008, the DOE issued PSLF programrelated regulations.28 Those regulations include a number of
provisions relating to program employment eligibility. First
of all, the regulations define “full-time” employment as the

27. See generally id.
28. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219. These regulations were issued by the DOE on October
23, 2008. 73 Fed. Reg. at 63,232–63,259.
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greater of 1) an annual average of 30 hours per week, 2) an
average of at least 30 hours per week for an employment
period of at least eight months, or 3) the number of hours per
week the employer regards as full-time employment.29 This
definition, while somewhat arbitrary, is reasonable and
consistent with other definitions of full-time employment
elsewhere in federal law. The regulations also define
“government employee” narrowly but sensibly as an
individual who is employed by a local, State, Federal or
Tribal government, but not by foreign governments or by
domestic or international intergovernmental agencies.30
This is all clear enough and consistent with the statute.
However, the DOE regulations then depart from the
statutory framework when they define an entity that they
label a “public service organization,” an entity that is not
referred to anywhere in the statutes creating the PSLF
program.31 A public service organization is defined by those
regulations in a complicated manner to include 1)
government organizations, 2) public child or family service
agencies, 3) non-profit organizations qualifying under
Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 501(c)(3), and
qualifying for tax exemption under Code section 501(a), but
not non-profit organizations that engage in religious

29. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b).
30. Id.
31. The DOE claimed when it issued its 2008 regulations that “the definition
of ‘public service organization’ is derived from the statutory definition of public
service job in section 455(m)(3)(B) of the HEA.” 73 Fed. Reg. 63,232 (Oct. 23,
2008). However, the linkage of this regulatory definition to the statute is
untenable because as I have noted above, that statute refers only to types of
public service employment and does not refer to types of qualifying employers,
with the exception of governments or Code section 501(c)(3) organizations. The
DOE also claims that the definition of a public service organization is “intended
to identify broad categories of eligible jobs rather than define specific jobs under
those categories.” Id. However, as I have discussed, that definition does not
identify or otherwise clarify the nature of either categories of jobs or specific jobs,
but instead only limits who can be an employer that can provide qualifying public
service jobs, and does so in a manner inconsistent with the governing statute that
does not impose any such limits.
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activities except those unrelated to religious instruction,
worship services or any form of proselytizing, 4) Tribal
colleges or universities, and 5) private organizations that
provide any one of a list of public services including, among
several other services, military service, public safety, law
enforcement, public interest law services, or public
education, but not businesses organized for profit, labor
unions, or partisan political organizations, and that are not
organizations engaged in religious activities unless the
qualifying public service activities are unrelated to religious
instruction, worship services, or any form of proselytizing.32
In short, a “public service organization” is defined essentially
to include only governments and non-profit entities, and with
certain non-profit entities such as labor unions, partisan
political organizations, and some religious organizations
excluded.
Given the statutory definition of a public service job,
however, there is no need for the DOE to define by
regulations a “public service organization.” Let me explain
this point. First, any full-time employment by government,
or by a Code section 501(c)(3) organization that is also taxexempt under Code section 501(a), qualifies under the
statute as a public service job regardless of the specific
nature of the employment. There is no requirement for fulltime employment by government or by a Code section
501(c)(3) organization to qualify as a public service job that
the employer qualify as a public service organization, or that
the employee of that organization be involved in any way in
providing any of the statutorily-listed public services on
behalf of that organization.
Second, and just as importantly, employment by any
non-governmental or non-Code section 501(c)(3) organization
also qualifies under the statute as a public service job if it
consists of a listed public service activity, regardless of who
the employer is, and regardless of what other activities the
32. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(b).
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employer may engage in. The statutory definition of a public
service job refers only to the various public services included,
and not to the nature of the organization providing those
services. In addition, if an employee of such a nongovernmental, non-Code section 501(c)(3) organization does
not work full-time providing a statutorily-listed public
service, then under the statute that person would not be
performing a public service job even if that employer qualifies
as a public service organization. So why does the DOE need
to define a “public service organization” when all full-time
employment by a government or by a Code section 501(c)(3)
organization is already covered under the statute as a public
service job, and when for full-time employees of any other
employer the statute makes clear that the nature of the
employer is not relevant for determining public interest job
status, but only the nature of the services performed by the
employee?
The DOE’s intent in defining this seemingly spurious
public service organization category is unclear. On one hand,
the definition operates to narrow eligibility for debt
forgiveness in some significant regards, but does so in a
manner that is inconsistent with the governing statute. On
the other hand, it also operates to broaden eligibility for debt
forgiveness in some regards, but again in a manner that is
inconsistent with the statute. The DOE, by defining this
entity, appears to have imposed its own judgment as to what
forms of employment should qualify as a public service job,
focusing heavily upon the nature of the employer without
paying much respect to the statutory definition that—except
for government or Code section 501(c)(3) employers—instead
focuses upon the nature of the services provided.
Let me first address the manner in which this DOE
definition of a public service organization inappropriately
narrows debt forgiveness eligibility. Several of the other
eligibility regulations that were issued at the same time
utilize this definition. First, the regulations narrowly define
“employee or employed” as referring only to an individual
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“who is hired and paid by a public service organization,”33
and not to employees of other organizations. There is,
however, no statutory basis for this narrow definition of
employment which excludes employees who are employed to
perform any of the statutorily-listed forms of public service
by employers who do not meet the definition of a public
service organization. The regulations then limit “law
enforcement” service to services performed by an employee
of a public service organization,34 thus possibly similarly
excluding some law enforcement public service employment
from qualifying.35
Perhaps most importantly, the regulations then define
“public interest law” as “legal services provided by a public
service organization that are funded in whole or in part by a
local, State, Federal or Tribal government.”36 This regulatory
definition has two obvious major problems. First, as
discussed above, the governing statute does not place any
type-of-employer restrictions regarding when employment to
provide public interest law services will qualify as a public
service job. Second, the governing statute also does not place
any source-of-funding restrictions on what would qualify as
public interest law services.
The DOE regulations, through this public service
organization definition, delineate what constitutes a public
service job more narrowly than does the governing statute.
In particular, the definition of a public service organization
denies eligibility to people who are employed to provide
statutorily-listed public service activities on behalf of nonprofit organizations that are engaged in certain religious

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. This restrictive regulation is redundant given that such persons would not
even qualify as “employed” under the regulations’ “employee or employed”
definition. See id.
36. Id.
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activities,37 and to people who are employed to provide
statutorily-listed public service activities on behalf of any of
several very common types of private organizations,
including for-profit businesses, labor unions and partisan
political organizations, and certain religious organizations.38
Moreover, as noted above, the regulations not only deny
eligibility to those persons who provide public interest legal
services on behalf of their employer if that employer is one of
the above noted employers that does not qualify as a public
service organization, but they also deny employees who
provide legal services for public service organizations if none
of the funding for those services is obtained from a
governmental body.39
Even if the governing statute did confer discretion upon
the DOE to selectively impose type-of-employer restrictions
regarding what forms of public service employment would
qualify as public service jobs, the rationale for the particular
employer exclusions imposed by the DOE is unclear. A forprofit business may choose to have some of its employees
work full-time to provide statutorily-listed public services for
longer-term firm reputational purposes or to satisfy the
perceived moral obligations of its shareholders, managers, or
employees, perhaps for a profit but perhaps also even if it is
not immediately profitable to do so.40 Those public services
would be just as valuable to the persons benefitted as if the
services had been provided by a governmental body or by a
non-profit organization. Similarly, labor unions, partisan
political organizations and religious organizations may each
have their own motivations for having some of their
employees provide statutorily-listed public services that are
of value to the persons benefitted. The governing statute

37. Id. § 689.219(b)(3)(ii).
38. Id. § 689.219(b)(5)(ii).
39. See id. § 689.219(b)(2).
40. For example, a law firm may assign one or more of its attorneys to do a
substantial amount of public interest law work on a pro bono basis.
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simply places no restriction upon public service employment
engaged in on behalf of such employers from qualifying as a
public service job, nor invites the DOE to do so.
One could argue that the statutory PSLF program
employment eligibility criteria are too broad and should be
narrowed so as to exclude employees who provide public
service for certain employers, perhaps precisely those forprofit employers and the particular non-profit employers
that are excluded by the DOE’s public service organization
definition.41 Congress could be fairly criticized for defining a
“public service job” in a somewhat vague and ambiguous
manner, and for providing very little clarifying legislative
history,42 and has thereby put the DOE in a difficult
regulatory position. In an ideal world Congress would now
adopt a clarifying amendment which would either: 1) make
it even more clear than the statute now does that eligibility
for debt forgiveness is based on the nature of the services
provided, and not the nature of the employer, for nongovernmental and non-Code section 501(c)(3) employers, 2)
amend the statute to explicitly embrace the DOE’s public
service organization-related employment eligibility criteria
for those employers, or 3) impose some other set of clear
employment eligibility requirements relating to employment
by non-governmental and non-Code section 501(c)(3)
employers. But given the extreme partisan polarization of
Congress at this time, however, such a clarifying amendment
is unlikely, particularly since it would have significant
revenue implications. For the same reason, it is simply not
credible to regard the Congressional inaction on this matter
since 2008 as being an implicit endorsement of the DOE’s
regulatory approach.
The DOE policymakers likely believe that the agency is
doing the best job that it can with its current regulations,
given the vagueness and ambiguities of the eligibility
41. Crespi, supra note 5, at 25–26.
42. See COLLEGE COST REDUCTION ACT OF 2007, supra note 7.
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statute. One could argue that given the current reality of
persistent Congressional gridlock it would be better if
executive branch agencies departed from particular
statutory constraints when, in light of their special expertise,
they determined that those statutory constraints are unwise,
given that Congress could certainly rein in such actions if it
chooses to do so. But, absent such a radical departure from
conventional separation of power understandings, if there is
to be a curtailment of public service job eligibility imposed
beyond the current statutory definition, including the
employment eligibility limitations that the DOE favors
imposing through its public service organization employer
requirement, this curtailment should be accomplished by
statutory amendment and not by an unauthorized DOE
departure from the statutory definition.
While the public service organization definition issued
by the DOE in its regulations so limits eligibility in a manner
inconsistent with the statute, on the other hand the
regulations also work to improperly broaden eligibility
beyond the outer statutory limits, in some regards, by
treating all persons who work full-time for public service
organizations as having a public service job,43 even if those
persons are not employed by a government or by a Code
section 501 (c)(3) organization, and are not involved in the
provision of a statutorily-listed public service. This is again
inconsistent with the statute, which clearly requires for a
public service job that the job involves full-time employment
“in” one or more of those public services if the employer is not
a government nor a Code section 501(c)(3) organization, 44
43. “The specific job that you perform does not matter, as long as you are
employed by an eligible public service organization.” Dep’t of Educ., Public
Service Loan Forgiveness: Questions and Answers for Federal Student Loan
Borrowers, FED. STUDENT AID, (December 2015), https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service/questions [hereinafter DOE
Questions and Answers]. “A borrower may obtain loan forgiveness under this
program if he or she…(ii) is employed full-time by a public service organization
[when the 120 required payments are made].” 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c).
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B)(i).
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and not merely employment in other, wholly unrelated
capacities by an organization of that sort that happens to
have some other employees providing public service. Once
again, unless one endorses aggressive regulatory departures
from statutory constraints as a modern accommodation to
consistent Congressional gridlock, this question would be
best addressed by Congress with a clarifying statutory
amendment one way or the other, which is unfortunately
unlikely, but the absence of such legislative clarification
again does not justify the DOE exceeding their statutory
authority.
The DOE regulations also leave a number of the other
employment eligibility issues that I have identified (and
others that I have not mentioned) unaddressed. As a general
matter, the regulations fail to clarify when the various
services provided to members of the public qualify as “public”
service. This is probably because of the (incorrect) decision
discussed above to base program eligibility for employees of
non-governmental and non-Code section 501(c)(3) employers
upon the status of the employer rather than upon the nature
of the services provided. In particular, the regulations
provide no guidance as to what services would qualify as
“public” education services, or whether that “education”
must be administered in a school or school-like setting for the
employment to qualify. They also do not clarify whether
public services provided outside of the United States
qualifies as a “public service job.”45
The DOE regulations also do not grapple with the
considerable difficulties that I have noted regarding which
claimed public interest legal services are to be properly
regarded under the statute as “law” services, and what “law”
services are to be properly regarded as “public interest” law
services, and whether the statutory (including…)
45. But the DOE has taken the position that public service employment by a
foreign not-for-profit organization will qualify (presumably even if those services
are provided outside of the U.S.) unless that foreign organization does not operate
in the U.S. DOE Questions and Answers, supra note 43.
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parenthetical listing of several forms of public interest legal
services is to be regarded as exclusive or merely illustrative.
These questions as to the proper scope of qualifying public
interest legal services have nothing to do with the nature of
the employer or the source of funding for the services, and
they are the important ambiguities in the statute that need
to be clarified by regulations. The current regulations
imposing
type-of-employer
and
source-of-funding
restrictions that are not present in the governing statute are
improperly constraining and are unhelpful with regard to
these statutory ambiguities noted above.
Finally, let me note that there is no requirement in the
statute—or even in the current DOE regulations—that, for
employment by a non-governmental and non-Code section
501(c)(3) organization, providing a public service must be the
primary purpose of an employer that provides a “qualifying
public service” that qualifies as a “public service job.” This
question of whether there is a “primary purpose of the
employer” eligibility limitation for some employees providing
public service is, however, an issue that has been raised in
ABA-DOE litigation that I will discuss below.
My overall conclusion here is that the employment
eligibility regulations that the DOE issued in 2008 to
implement the PSLF program are incomplete and in some
important ways inconsistent with the governing statute,
although as I have noted above it could be argued that the
DOE’s regulations are superior to the statutory criteria in
promoting public service. Now that the coming flood of debt
forgiveness applications under this program is almost upon
us, additional regulations are needed which clarify the
precise contours of the various forms of qualifying public
service employment, and which discard the unnecessary
concept of a public service organization which is both
improperly restrictive in some regards and improperly
permissive in others, and which also make clear that there is
no requirement in the statute that the public services at
issue be the primary purpose of the employer.
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III. THE ABA-DOE LITIGATION
Under the Obama Administration, the DOE in 2016
contacted a number of persons who had previously received
FedLoan Servicing certification, informing them that a
period of their employment would qualify for debt
forgiveness, and then retroactively rescinded those
certifications based on a DOE determination that the
certifications were made in error and that the employment
did not qualify as a public service job. In response to these
DOE actions the ABA, on December 20, 2016, filed a federal
lawsuit on behalf of itself and four named individuals who
had received such rescission notifications, seeking to
reinstate those certifications.46
Those four individuals had worked for Vietnam Veterans
of America, the American Immigration Lawyers Association,
the ABA, and ProBAR Children’s Project, respectively.47 As
best as I can determine from the several pleadings filed in
this case, the basis for these DOE determinations for three
of the individuals was that the DOE had decided
employment by these organizations did not qualify as a
“public service job” because the public interest legal services
provided by those individuals on behalf of their organizations
were not the primary purpose of those organizations.48 In the
fourth instance, the DOE’s action was apparently based on
its determination that because the public education that the
organization at issue had provided was not provided “in a
school or school-like setting” it therefore did not qualify as
“public education” under the statute.49 This lawsuit is still in
its very early stages, with only the ABA’s complaint and
DOE’s summary denial-type answer,50 and a subsequent
46. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, A.B.A. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., No. 16-cv-02476-RDM (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2016).
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 22.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Defendants’ Answer at 1, A.B.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-02476-
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ABA summary judgment motion51 having been filed as of
June 1, 2017. This trial could easily take a year or more
before it is decided and the result will also likely be appealed
by whichever party loses, further delaying the ultimate
resolution of this question.
With the 2017 inauguration of President Donald Trump
and the subsequent appointment of DOE Secretary Betsy
DeVos, there will surely be major shifts in DOE policies. In
particular, the Trump Administration’s proposed fiscal year
2018 budget set forth in May of 2017 called for the
prospective termination of the PSLF program for most postJuly 1, 2018 Direct Loans,52 although it did not call for
retroactive termination of the program with regard to
existing Direct Loans, nor for any change in the tax
treatment of debt forgiven under this program. The new
Trump Administration policy orientation will undoubtedly
moot some regulatory issues as some Obama Administration
policy initiatives will be rescinded or scaled back. However,
given the Trump Administration’s proposal to prospectively
abolish the PSLF program with regard to future Direct
Loans, this earlier attempt under the Obama Administration
to restrict the PSLF program’s availability with regard to
some current Direct Loan borrowers by imposing new and
narrower interpretations of its regulations to rescind
previously granted certifications is likely to be among the few
Obama Administration actions that will find favor with the
current Administration. I therefore expect the DOE will
continue to vigorously contest this ABA challenge to those
actions.
Based on my analysis, however, I have concluded that
the ABA is virtually certain to prevail in this litigation.
There is simply no basis for imposing a “primary purpose of

RDM (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2017).
51. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, A.B.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., No. 16-cv-02476-RDM (D.D.C. May 24, 2017).
52. Trump Proposed Budget (2017), supra note 23, at 20.
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the employer” limitation on qualifying public interest law
services activities to be found in the statute, or for that
matter even in the existing DOE regulations. The DOE may
be attempting to cut back somewhat on its broad grant of
eligibility to all persons who work for public service
organizations even if they do not provide public services in
their employment. However, the better solution here is to go
back and rescind this improperly broad grant of eligibility to
all public service organization employees. The DOE should
instead limit eligibility for persons not employed by a
governmental body, or a Code section 501(c)(3) organization,
as the statute calls for, rather than try to limit that overly
broad eligibility criterion by another eligibility criterion
“patch” that also lacks a statutory grounding.
The statute’s very general definition of a public service
job arguably leaves the DOE with some discretion as to how
to define “public education” services, but the DOE has not
issued regulations in that regard, and the court may well
decide that imposing a restrictive “school or school-like
setting” requirement for “education” services with so little
statutory basis for such a restriction without providing
advance notice through a rulemaking and comment
procedure is an abuse of its discretion.
All four of the employer organizations for which the DOE
issued to employees the rescission of certification notices at
issue in this litigation qualify under the DOE regulations as
public service organizations. That litigation therefore does
not challenge this definitional regulation as being
inconsistent with the governing statute, either for being too
broad or too restrictive as to eligibility. But the issue as to
whether that definition is improperly restrictive is certain to
be raised in subsequent class action litigation under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)53 once people begin to
start receiving (or being denied) debt forgiveness.54
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012).
54. Persons who are denied debt forgiveness by the DOE, and who believe
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Under the APA people have a right to judicial review of
a final agency action for which they have no other adequate
remedy.55 The courts can then review a final agency
regulation or other final action to determine if it exceeds the
agency’s statutory jurisdiction.56 While the courts under
Chevron generally give great deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its statutory jurisdiction,57 such deference
will not be given when the legislation directly and clearly
addresses the question at issue.58 As I have discussed, I
believe that the statute is quite clear that if employees of
non-governmental
and
non-Code
section
503(c)(3)
organizations provide statutorily-listed public services on a
full-time basis then they hold public service jobs, so that no
deference to the DOE’s more restrictive regulatory
interpretation is called for.
A reasonable argument can concededly be made that
given the vagueness of the term “public” that appears several
times in the statute the DOE should be given substantial
leeway to define when particular services of one sort or
another that are provided to members of the public qualify
that they qualify for debt forgiveness under the statute, as discussed in the text
infra, will have standing to challenge the DOE decision. However, those persons
who claim that they are injured by the DOE providing debt forgiveness to some
borrowers outside of the statutory eligibility limitations, at the expense of the
loss of future federal debt repayment revenues, will probably be denied standing
to contest those grants of debt forgiveness on the basis that they have only the
generalized interest in fiscally responsible governance shared by all citizens, and
have not suffered a concrete and particularized injury meriting individual
redress. See JARED COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 6–7 (2016). The only remedy for
impermissibly broad grants of debt forgiveness by the DOE may be Congressional
action that clarified the statutory limitations and overrode the conflicting
regulations. Such Congressional action would raise a difficult question as to the
ability of the DOE to then reimpose debt repayment obligations on those persons
whose debts had been wrongly discharged.
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c) (2012).
57. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984).
58. Id. at 841–42.
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as “public” services. However, as discussed above, this
statutory vagueness calls for clarification as to the nature of
each of the statutorily-listed qualifying services and provides
no basis for the DOE to impose restrictions as to the
providers of those services.
A challenge under the APA to the DOE’s “public service
organization”-based employer eligibility limitations may
encounter a threshold difficulty under the six-year statute of
limitations that generally applies to civil actions against the
federal government, since that regulation was adopted in
2008.59 However, it could be argued in litigation initiated by
a person who provides a qualifying public service, but is
denied PSLF program eligibility in 2017 or later on the basis
of not being employed by a “public service organization,” that
his injury occurred when his application was improperly
denied and not earlier when that regulation was first issued.
It is arguably unfair that a person would be denied relief on
the basis of the expiration of a statute of limitations years
prior to their suffering injury and becoming aware of the
regulatory overreach. If this statute of limitations hurdle can
be surmounted and the court is able to reach the merits of
this question, then, as I have discussed, that challenge is
likely to be successful, given the clear statutory language,
and the DOE regulation will then be invalidated if it has not
been previously withdrawn.
The ABA-DOE litigation also raises another interesting
question: if the DOE has indirectly, through a contractor,
certified a period of employment as being qualifying public
service for a particular applicant, should the DOE then be
estopped from later changing this decision and rescinding
that certification? At least with regard to those specific
persons receiving those prior certifications if not also for
other persons “similarly situated” with regard to their
employment who have also received prior certifications,

59. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012).
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however broadly “similarly situated” is defined?60 This
potential issue will be mooted should the courts rule that the
DOE’s bases for rescinding the prior employment
certifications for those particular individuals joining the
litigation are untenable under the statutory criteria, which I
strongly expect will be the ultimate ruling, at least with
regard to the “primary purpose” issue.
Should, however, the District Court or a subsequent
appellate court surprisingly rule in favor of the DOE
regarding either or both of its “primary purpose” or “schoollike setting” arguments supporting their rescission of
employment certifications, then that court will have to
address the estoppel issue. This result here is difficult to
predict. There is a substantial body of case law regarding
regulatory estoppel, but it is inconsistent and fact-specific
reflecting rather subjective and ad hoc judicial balancing of
private and public interests.61 I will not conduct an analysis
of this estoppel issue in this Article, since I believe it unlikely
that this issue will be presented in this case. However, if the
issue does arise it is not clear how the courts would balance,
in this particular context, the reliance interest of the persons

60. “Similarly situated” could be defined narrowly to only include those
persons who also provided public service on behalf of the same employer who
have received employment certifications for that employment. Or the phrase
could be defined much more broadly to include any persons who had previously
received employment certification.
61. For discussion of these regulatory estoppel issues and the inconsistent
jurisprudence in this area see generally Raoul Berger, Do Regulations Really Bind
Regulators?, 62 NW. U. L. REV. 137 (1967); Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency
Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV.
1187 (1997); Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break
Their Own ‘Laws’, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985); Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, Relying on
Government in Comparison: What can the United States Learn from Abroad in
Relation to Administrative Estoppel?, 38 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 75
(2015); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object:
Estoppel Remedies for an Agency’s Violation of its Own Regulations or Other
Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653 (1992); Rodney A. Smolla, The Erosion of the
Principle that the Government Must Follow Self-Imposed Rules, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 472 (1984); Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 629 (1974).
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adversely affected by rescission of prior DOE assurances
against the public interest in maintaining governmental
regulatory flexibility and fiscal responsibility. There appears
to be a real chance that estoppel would be granted, although
the scope of such a ruling in terms of the number of persons
affected beyond the specific parties to the litigation is
difficult to predict.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DOE
I offer several recommendations, and I hope that the
DOE will seriously consider adopting some—or all—of these
recommendations as soon as possible, hopefully well in
advance of the coming surge of PSLF program debt
forgiveness applications that may otherwise likely lead to
much unnecessary litigation.
First, the DOE should let it be known to Congress that it
would be very helpful if the governing employment eligibility
statute was amended to clarify some of the many difficulties
that it presents prior to the coming flood of debt forgiveness
applications. Unfortunately, Congress as now constituted is
not likely to respond favorably to this request. If then left to
act on its own, the DOE should first of all immediately
rescind the “public service organization” definition and then
remove that phrase from the other employment eligibilityrelated regulations, since as I have discussed its use departs
from the statutory directive as to eligibility in two opposite
ways. First, there is no basis under the governing statute for
imposing a restriction on debt forgiveness eligibility based on
the characteristics of the employer. Only the nature of the
services provided by the employee is relevant here; is the
employee doing a full-time public service job? In addition,
there is also no statutory basis for allowing persons who
work for employers who are neither governments nor Code
section 501(c)(3) organizations to be regarded as holding
public service jobs if they are not “in” such work, if they do
not themselves do public service work on a full-time basis
even if other organization employees do so. This definition is
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therefore likely to come under challenge once the DOE
begins to grant or deny applications for debt forgiveness on
this basis.62
Second, the DOE should also immediately adopt a
regulation clarifying that there is no “primary purpose of the
employer” requirement for public service employment to
qualify as a public service job, and then move to have the
relevant portions of the current ABA-DOE litigation
dismissed as mooted by that new regulation.
Finally, the DOE should as soon as reasonably possible
set forth for public comment, and then adopt, in light of those
comments, a series of carefully considered regulations
clarifying the contours of each of the various statutorilylisted categories of qualifying public service. I have noted
several of the major vaguenesses and ambiguities of the
governing statute, particularly regarding what would qualify
as public interest law services. The DOE should attempt to
provide clear and workable guidance to persons seeking to
determine whether certain types of public service
employment will qualify for debt forgiveness under this
program.
V. CONCLUSION
The Trump Administration is in a difficult position with
regard to the PSLF program. Even if it is able to
prospectively eliminate the program, as it has recommended
in its fiscal year 2018 budget proposal, it would still be facing
the prospects of multi-billion-dollar annual program costs
over the next decade as large numbers of existing Direct

62. It is clear that persons who are denied eligibility for debt forgiveness
because their public service employment was not done for the benefit of a “public
service organization” would have standing to sue and an incentive to challenge
the regulations. However, it appears unlikely that any person would have
standing to contest the improper grant of debt forgiveness under the statute to a
person who works for a public service organization that is not a government or a
section 501(c)(3) organization, but whose work does not involve public service
activities. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704.
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Loan borrowers qualify for tax-exempt debt forgiveness, with
the benefits regressively skewed towards mid-career doctors
and lawyers. However, given the reliance of hundreds of
thousands or more borrowers now working in public service
on being able to eventually have their remaining student
loan debts forgiven, and without tax consequences, it would
be politically (and perhaps also legally)63 very difficult to
retroactively terminate the program or remove the tax
benefits by statute to avoid some or all of those costs,
although such efforts may eventually be made.
The DOE’s imposition of a public services organization
employer limitation by regulation in 2008 in the waning days
of the Bush Administration appears to be an early attempt
to limit PSLF program debt forgiveness eligibility in the face
of anticipated large budgetary costs, while as I have noted
interestingly also broadening eligibility in some other ways.
Yet, as I have shown, this regulatory definition and its
application through other regulations is not consistent with
the statutory employment eligibility criteria which do not
limit eligibility on the basis of the nature of the employer,
but only on the basis of the services provided, which, on the
other hand, do require employees of certain organizations to
directly provide public service to qualify for debt forgiveness.
The public service organization definition and the utilization
of that definition to narrow several other eligibility criteria
and broaden others should therefore be rescinded as soon as
possible.
The rescinding by the DOE in 2016 of some previously
granted employment certifications appears to have been
another attempt, this time by the Obama Administration
and continued so far by the Trump Administration in the face
of the ABA’s challenge, to limit PSLF program eligibility (in
this instance with a claimed “primary purpose of the
employer” limitation for certain employers) without having
to pass controversial retroactive legislation to that effect.
63. See generally Crespi, supra note 5.

852

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

However, I have concluded that this effort will probably fail.
The courts in this ABA-DOE litigation will likely find this
criterion to also be inconsistent with the statute and will not
uphold the DOE’s attempt to impose this limitation. The
DOE should therefore clarify that there is no “primary
purpose” employer limitation for non-governmental and nonCode section 501(c)(3) organization employers and move to
dismiss the relevant portions of this litigation.
Given the great deference given by courts to regulatory
interpretations of statutes,64 the governing PSLF statute
could arguably be interpreted to give the DOE the discretion
to define when particular services are “public” services,
and/or to limit qualifying public education employment to
education that is provided in a school or school-like setting.
The statute, similarly, could arguably be interpreted to allow
the DOE to deny eligibility to employees of foreign
governments and/or to some persons providing public
services for foreign organizations.65 Given that these
constraints are not made obvious or even strongly suggested
by the statute, the DOE should, perhaps, first be required
under the APA to provide for public comment regulations to
that effect before it began imposing any of these restrictions.
Finally, in the event that the courts in the ABA-DOE
litigation do uphold one or both of the two bases articulated
by the DOE for rescinding previously granted employment
certifications, I believe that a strong argument can be made
that the DOE should nevertheless be estopped from doing so,
at least for those persons receiving those certifications and
perhaps also for “similarly situated” persons who have also
received certifications, however broadly that group is
defined.66
In conclusion, what the DOE should really be doing is to
leave the difficult cost and benefit incidence issues posed by
64. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841–42.
65. DOE Questions and Answers, supra note 43.
66. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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the PSLF program to the Administration and Congress to
resolve. It should encourage Congress to so act, and make its
preferences known and attempt to justify them. A favorable
Congressional response is unfortunately unlikely anytime
soon. But until there is Congressional action, the DOE
should not continue to impose employment eligibility
limitations (or expansions) through regulatory actions that
go beyond its statutory mandate. It should rescind those
statutorily-inconsistent regulations and instead make a
serious effort to provide more detailed regulatory guidance
to the public regarding exactly what forms of public service
employment will qualify under the statute as a public service
job that may lead to eventual debt forgiveness, particularly
with regard to public interest legal services.

